751. Wilson, Bryan R. "An Analysis of Sect Development." American Sociological Review 24 (1), 1959a: 3-15.
A typology: sects may be conversionist, adventist, pietistic or gnostic.
752. ———. Magic and the Millennium: A Sociological Study of Religious Movements of Protest Among Tribal and Third-world Peoples. London: Heinemann, 1973.
"Valuable for the dialectic it establishes between thaumaturgy and eschatology, [but] asserts a higher absolute value for Western political organization and rationality." (H. Schwartz, 1976: item 601.)
An extended comparison of various third-world groups, millenarian and otherwise, according to Wilson's typology of their modes of relating to the rest of the world in which magic is seen to be a central element in salvation.
753. ———. The Noble Savage: The Primitive Origins of Charisma and its Contemporary Survivals. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1975b.
Wilson uses charisma in its strict sense to refer to the possession of supernatural gifts; however, from the sociological point of view, belief in charisma, not charisma itself, is real. This belief can, in his view, only exist in pre-modern societies. In modern usage, the term means something more like sex appeal than its original meaning of authority, and charismatic leadership is entirely marginal, since the rationalization of modern life allows no scope for its exercise. [It seems to me that this perhaps over-narrow definition forces Wilson to overlook important elements of modern leadership that, if not exactly charismatic in his strict sense, are enough like it to make little operational difference.] "Rational" politics prevents its exercise. [But how rational is politics? Ronald Reagan can have been elected on no other basis than his over-schooled and elusive doddering grandpa's charm, and Margaret Thatcher on her dowdy but forceful absolute lack of it.] In Wilson's view, personal qualities are no more than "residual" in politics. [His argument is based on a naively ideological view of the nature of politics and of rationality: since the world ought to be rational, it by-God is.]
He observes correctly that Weber is talking about a relationship, which, as followers experience it, consists of trust. He takes correct exception with Shils (1958) in noting that charisma implies disorder, and its application to bureaucracy implies a hidden ideological agenda. [It's odd how both the misapplication of charisma and its radical denial can serve approximately the same ideology.]
Charismatic movements' expressiveness is the benefit they confer and the salvation they offer, and personal trust is a minimal requirement for their existence. Such personifications of power are common in traditional societies, and charisma exemplifies an extreme of this thought. Charisma challenges the traditional order but also responds to changes in it. Where charisma is traditional, change is not a necessary contextual step. The plausibility of the charismatic person depends on his appropriateness for the role. [Though Wilson at least mentions the fairly common attribution of charisma to the "feeble-minded," epileptics and children, he overlooks the obvious point that in the ordinary course of events these people are the least powerful members of any society. Why shouldn't charisma, in his strict sense, adhere to those who are already powerful in everyday terms? I suggest it is exactly because of the extraordinary and revolutionary nature of charisma: at least in millennialism it by definition proposes to reverse the established order, and thus must logically appear in the least powerful persons. Besides, in millennialism established authority has already failed; its charisma is false.]
In traditional societies charisma is an "objectification" by reference to which society can perceive itself and recognize the possibility of new modes of interaction and power; belief creates charisma (p. 33). Among pre-literate societies, no organization [beyond the local level?] is possible; thus charisma must always fail. [It sounds very much as if Wilson is doing his very best to make charisma disappear altogether; it almost can't appear in "rational" societies and is doomed to failure in primitive ones.] What's more, the possibility of manipulation to produce miracles is limited. [This seems to me accurate only when large and dramatic miracles are required; but among people who want to believe in their possibility (and it seems to me that millenarists almost by definition fit this category by virtue of their presumably desperate situations), relatively insignificant miracles will do to sustain belief, even in technologically advanced societies÷witness Quarantelli and Wegner's Ouija board group, item 560.] The prophet is invariably a "deranged individual" (p. 35), and nearly all of these movements are condemned to have only insignificant social results.
Wilson introduces the important concept of "charismatic demand" which arises in circumstances like the Congo where, after a meteoric seven-month career, Simon Kimbangu was arrested and railroaded to a life sentence in exile. In his wake a great many grouplets arose, led by people who claimed to be or to represent Kimbangu. Such movements may also arise in anticipation of a charismatic leader. Wilson says they are especially to be expected in situations of little individual differentiation and acculturation. The Jon Frum (or Jonfrum) movement provides an example in which weak leaders provided a context in which the arrival of a truly charismatic leader was widely anticipated. [This sounds very much like the "role suction" observed in small therapy groups, where indeed there is little differentiation and a sort of acculturation by, I believe, Abraham Maslow: (1967).]
Charisma is like credit: it is the occasion of social transformation, and its success depends only on faith. Limited role differentiation prevents its appearance except when a society is in turmoil. The great man theory is a sociological and therefore an important fact. In modern societies charisma is "derived [therefore] attenuated" (p. 116). It appears in revivalism, where the message is God's, not the prophet's. [But it appears that this is true of all prophecy--the prophet is the mediator with a source of authority, so his own authority is similarly derivative.] The closest modern equivalent to Weber's real charisma is that of pop stars.
754. ———. "The Debate over 'Secularization.'" Encounter 45 (4), 1975c: 77-83.
Secularization is the staple of all sociology since Comte. Arguments that it is not taking place adduce evidence (like the recent proliferation of new religious movements) that really prove the contrary: these arise only because secularization is so far advanced that they don't ultimately matter. Or the evidence is simply false--charismatic groups reflect the presence of secularization by responding to it, not to its absence. See also the following entries.
755. ———. Contemporary Transformations of Religion. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1976.
756. ———. Sects and Society: A Sociological Study of Three Religious Groups in Britain. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978. Reprint of 1961 edn., London: Heinemann.
A study of three "bizarre, marginal and archaic ... micro-cults." Burridge (1968: item 143) finds that this work exemplifies an "ethnographic" type of explanation which concentrates on socio-economic context while paying scant attention to the movement's history and traditional bases.
757. ———. "Time, Generation and Sectarianism." In The Social Impact of New Religious Movements edited by Bryan Wilson. New York: Rose of Sharon Press, 1981a: 217-34.
New religious movements do not altogether fit old categories. News of new groups spreads faster than they do, and Wilson assumes this is a qualitatively new phenomenon [I find room to doubt it; bush telegraphs, wherever they may appear, are notoriously quick acting]. The current ones recruit especially the young, and Wilson asserts that this is also new, though again there seems room for doubt. In any case, this keeps the media interested for a variety of reasons, most of them cultural. He attribute the movements' appeal to the young to that sociological chestnut, anomie and loss of core values. The exotic has unquestionable appeal.
Movements' messages are always urgent. ["Act now!" runs the slogan "while supplies last!" only in this case it's "while the world lasts!"] All of history is but a prelude to this moment (cf. Mead & Schwartz, 1960, item 482 for a similar view from a different context) at which the movement arises. This central place in history is a logical necessity of the movement's [presumed] totalism. This is particularly apparent in millennialism, where the End is always at hand. Revivalists take the same tack, if only because of the unpredictability of death, a personal Armageddon. [And perhaps a model for the global version? Is this momentism perhaps shared in the Human Potential Movement's slogan "be here now"? Wilson ignores the possibility that, more than a doctrinal point this could also be a selling point, designed to cancel critical thought, especially among the likes of Christian Science and Scientology, where no millennial message is urged.]
As opposed to churches, which propose a continuous and essentially unchanging view of time ("as it was in the beginning, is now and ever shall be, world without end, Amen") these take an elliptical view; history leaps from Christ or the old testament to now. Anything occurring in between is irrelevant and essentially void. [Where in this schema is there room for the essentially ahistorical encounter movement, which bills itself as completely without precedent, a totally new departure, despite abundant evidence to the contrary? See item 527.] The church is by nature accomodationist and here for the long haul.
The new movements make a possibly calculated appeal to that egotism which finds the notion of special election thrilling, and that idea is inherent in the "fact" that history culminates just at this moment, when you, you blessed dog, happen to be alive, and can be among God's elect. People do not examine these claims more critically than they do [and there is no evidence adduced to show how critically that may be] "because" of a general abandonment of humanistic education, which has also led to a general ignorance of history, so the cults' time-scheme fits neatly with the contextual view.
New movements are "hostages" (p.229) to their cultures because they adopt modern marketing and organizational methods. [Because a group operates in terms familiar to its own time it is not therefore a "hostage" to its time, any more than the Anabaptists were to theirs; would Wilson seriously expect the Unification Church, say, to adopt the methods and ideas of the Anabaptists?] He seems disappointed that "when transcendent Truth comes to earth and is made flesh--it is dressed in the style of the times" (p.232). [When Jesus Christ delivered his message, did he style it according to the late Stone Age or the high Renaissance? It is a sociological truism that relevance is essential to charisma, and it is difficult to imagine that a modern movement could be relevant if it couched its message in the language of, and took its methods from, the King James Bible and Mohammad, respectively.]
758. ———. The New Religions: Preliminary Considerations. In New Religious Movements: A Perspective for Understanding Society edited by Eileen Barker. New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1982: 16-31.
Wilson argues against a general theory of NRMs. Questions that need to be asked to make the term useful are: What is new about them? Are their functions similar in different contexts? To what extent can their character remain through expansion in time and space? "Novelty" forces us to consider movements in context, by contrast with the tradition out of which they arise; they offer "a surer, shorter, swifter or clearer way to salvation" (p. 17). [This seems to me inaccurate. How can Shakerism, for example, claim to meet these criteria? The cargo movements must be seen by contrast, not to their tradition, but to the new socio-economic context to which they surely respond. Taken only to refer to the contemporary West, this seems sound.]
The "new" may restore the ancient [revitalization], apply material from other cultures, or "invent" something new. There is a "loose" trend towards the demotic. The deity becomes proximate, and "spiritual abundance" is offered. Enthusiasm is a common feature [depending on the nature of the tradition; the Nation of Islam proposes austere styles opposed to the black Dyonisiac tradition]. They enhance life. This creates a problem of sustaining and containing this enthusiasm. Containing it frequently comes quickly to be the focus. Order is the only assurance of stability and growth--predictability. When a movement spreads while remaining loose, it is a fad, not a commitment.
Pluralistic tradition militates against success, because an idea of exclusive access to truth is lacking. The west does have this tradition [considerably watered down by now, I'd expect.] There is a [paradoxical] need for both fervor and discipline. Emotional control is demanded at a very high level of dedication. This discipline is a forerunner of the new order which all movements at least imply. [Are they all millennial, then?] The procedures are always arbitrary to a degree, though often simplified, and organization may be highly rationalized and secular in spirit. NRMs respond to but do not represent needs such as "spiritual malaise." Movements may define needs for some members.
Personality may have nothing to do with recruitment, which may be based on life situations. Facilitating factors include: toleration; alienation of communities from the establishment; and modern anomie. Mass media are of little help except for print. [This seems like an odd assertion; surely television is a godsend in spreading awareness of these movements, though admittedly it won't publicize doctrine beyond its most superficial and sensationalist aspects.] We should observe the current importance of various forms of psychic healing.
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